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THE DEMYSTIFICATION OF LEGAL
DISCOURSE: RECONCEIVING THE
ROLE OF THE POVERTY LAWYER AS
AGENT OF THE POOR©
BY CHERIE ROBERTSON*
By employing traditional methods of legal
representation when acting on behalf of those living in
poverty, lawyers act to perpetuate the disempowerment
of poor people.. While the systemic barriers
confronting the poor must be addressed, so too must
the power of the poor to help themselves through
organization and resistance. The task of the poverty
lawyer committed to facilitating the agency of the poor
is made difficult by the exclusivity and formalism of
legal discourse, the constraints of the Rules of
Professional Conduct, and by traditional understandings
of the appropriate role of lawyers. However, a
reconceptualization of the role of the poverty lawyer is
essential if anti-poverty initiatives are to be successful
in the long term.
En utilisant les m6thodes traditionnelles de
representation juridique quand ils repr~sentent des
personnes vivant dans la pauvret6, les avocat(e)s
agissent de fagon A perp~tuer la d~shabilitation des
personnes pauvres. Le probl~me des barri~res
systdmiques auxquelles sont confront~s les gens pauvres
doit Etre soulev6, de meme que la question du pouvoir
des pauvres de s'aidereux-m8mes par l'organisation et
la rdsistance. L'exclusivit6 et le formalisme du discours
juridique, les contraintes des Rules of Professional
Conduct et la conception traditionnelle du r6le que
doivent jouer les avorat(e)s rendent plus difficile la
tfche de l'avocat(e) se destinant & repr6senter des gens
d6favoris~s 6conomiquement. Cependant, une
reconceptualisation du r6le de l'avocat(e) qui
reprdsente des gens pauvres est n~cessaire si nous
voulons voir les initiatives anti-pauviet6 atre
couronnees de succA-s.
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I. INTRODUCTION
"Laws grind the poor and rich men rule the law."I
Law presents itself as a neutral and exacting system of rules, a
comprehensive and intricate synthesis of categories, which when applied
to virtually any set of circumstances, no matter how complex or
idiosyncratic, will provide a just result. Generally, lawyers present
themselves as the expert technicians of this machine. My experience as a
caseworker in the workers' rights division of Parkdale Community Legal
Services (PCLS) has reinforced my belief that this view of law is deeply
flawed. Moreover, my time at PCLS crystallized the many misgivings that
I have about the ability of law and of lawyers to redress unequal
distributions of wealth. It is through my work at PCLS-through time
spent with individuals living in dire material need, through my
recognition that my legal training did not make me a better or stronger
person than those whom I was representing, and through my frustration
and sense of impotence at watching real people and their real-life
problems slip through legal cracks-that I have come to fully appreciate
that an alleviation of poverty and its attendant asperities will not be
achieved by the formulaic wielding of case law and statutes.
Poverty lawyers employing traditional methods of lawyering
when representing those living in poverty are, for all intents and
purposes, applying band-aids. While individual clients may reap short-
term benefits on occasion from this kind of lawyering, the roots of
poverty are left unexplored, and the poor 2 themselves remain detached
I Oliver Goldsmith as quoted in R. Cotterrell, The Sociology of Law: An Introduction (London:
Butterworths, 1992) at 110.
2 Although I will refer throughout this article to "the poor," "poor clients," "poor people" or
derivatives thereof, I in no way wish to convey an image of those who live in poverty as a
homogeneous, monolithic group with uniform and unanimous goals and desires. I agree with
William Simon when he writes, "[p]oor people are not more likely than nonpoor people to have
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from the problem of "poverty" as constructed by those advocating on
their behalf. A reevaluation of the problem of poverty as construed in
the legal context, and a reconceptualization of the role that poverty
lawyers play in this framework are necessary before effective strategies
can be devised. When one considers the current political situation in
Ontario, the time to engage in such a pursuit should be sooner rather
than later.
State protection of workers' rights in Ontario under the
Conservative government of Mike Harris is decreasing continually.
Major changes have been made to the procedural provisions of the
Employment Standards Act,3 and the substantive changes to thisAct are
pending. Next on the government's agenda is the "reform" of the
Workers' Compensation Act.4 At the federal level, the situation is not
much better. Bill C-12 effectively rewrote the Unemployment Insurance
consensus about their interests": W.H. Simon, "The Dark Secret of Progressive Lawyering: A
Comment on Poverty Law Scholarship in the Post-Modem, Post-Reagan Era" (Paper presented at
The University of Toronto, Faculty of Law, 10 February 1995) at 9 [unpublished]. I am aware that
by even using these terms I risk labelling and oversimplifying a diverse group of people, but I will
submit that in order to use language as a means of human communication in any way, we are
constantly forced to essentialize people and things. The dilemma of engaging in identity politics
without essentializing the individuals within the groups on behalf of which we advocate has not been
solved, and is part of the larger tension between the individual and the collective, the specific and
the general. In the case of poor people, however, there is a persuasive argument to be made that
generalizations are appropriate on some level.
As Shelley Gavigan has written:
Poverty law is poor people's law. Form and content aside, this means that the pivotal
defining criterion is financial or economic. ... Whilst acknowledging that there are many
different perspectives on the meaning of poverty and many measures thereof, it is my
view ... that the economic indices, if probed and recast, reveal a coherence not often
enough acknowledged.
See S. Gavigan, "Poverty Law and Poor People: The Place of Gender and Class in Clinic
Practice" (1995) 11 J.L. & Social Pol'y 165 at 174. I would only add that, while I agree that class
issues can be said to be material in some sense-for example, one either has capital or one does
not-the intersection of class with various other possible traits of marginalization can and does
produce a variety of amalgams, not all of which will benefit equally from a paradigmatic anti-capital
approach.
3 R.S.O. 1990, c. E.14. The Employment Standards Act is the statute in Ontario which
guarantees minimum standards in the workplace such as maximum hours of work per day, minimum
wage, overtime, vacation, and termination pay.
4 R.S.O. 1990, c. W.11. The Workers' Compensation Act provides compensation, health care
benefits, and rehabilitation services to workers injured on the job, their survivors and dependants.
In addition, it acts proactively to reduce the incidence of on-the-job injuries and occupational
diseases, and to promote health and safety in working environments.
See the Workers' Compensation Reform Act, 1997, S.O. 1997, c. 16, which will be brought into
force on 1 January 1998. The statute replaces the original Act, by Schedule A, with the Workplace
Safety Insurance Act, 1997. Among other things, the new Act reduces the benefits paid to workers
from 90 per cent of pre-injury net average earnings to 85 per cent.
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Act.5 The Employment Insurance Act6 was passed on 20 June 1996 and
embodies what the government refers to as "a comprehensive
modernization of the system." 7 The legislative changes at both the
federal and provincial levels reflect a harder, sharper approach to the
delivery of employment programs in particular, and social programs in
general. In addition, the funding to the Ontario Legal Aid Plan has
been drastically reduced. Central to the agendas of the government at
both levels is a concern about deficit-reduction, global competitiveness,
and national and provincial bureaucratic efficiency. Both governments
have generated support for their cutbacks and economic restructuring
initiatives by reviving and fortifying social myths about social service
abusers, administrative "duplication," and the need for individuals to
help themselves and improve their personal situations without reliance
on the government. The prime targets of this renewed survival of the
fittest philosophy have been society's most vulnerable: those most
marginalized and in whose interests social support programs were
developed in the first place.
This swing to the right of the political spectrum-in Ontario
particularly-has created many new obstacles for those committed to
fighting poverty. As the social safety net erodes, community organizers,
social activists and progressive lawyers are having to reconfigure
strategies to retain the protective mechanisms and legislation currently
in place, and to develop new methods of tackling the problems of
poverty. Many doing poverty law have found ourselves on the frontline
dealing with one crisis after another. Perhaps it is not accidental that
our best energies and creativity are being spent in simply maintaining our
clients. It is consistent with the agenda of this government that its most
astute critics and its most unruly dissidents be preoccupied with applying
bandaids to society's most needy. While crisis management is crucial,
there has never been a more important time for those concerned with
the unequal distribution of capital to collaborate, to collectively
brainstorm, and to form coalitions against the undertakings of this
Conservative government. This article will argue that, in order for this
movement to be successful, it must have at its centre those directly
affected by poverty. It is only with the avid and large-scale participation
of the poor themselves that anti-poverty initiatives will be effective in the
long-term. My argument draws on the extensive theoretical works of
5 R.S.C. 1985, c. U-1.
6 S.C. 1996, c. 23.
7 1bi& at ix.
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those who have written on this subject, but more essentially, it is shaped
by my experience working as a caseworker at PcLs. The sooner that we,
as poverty lawyers, recognize that our capacity to fight poverty is limited
and that what power we may possess is maximized when used in
conjunction with the efforts of those who make up the communities in
which we work, the sooner we will truly be able to envision and work
toward long-term, comprehensive, and effective strategies for change.
Central to any discussion about the increased participation of
clients in their own legal affairs should be a rethinking of the role that
poverty lawyers play in their interactions with clients. Traditionally, the
lawyer has assumed-perhaps unintentionally in the case of poverty
lawyers-the role of gatekeeper to state legislation. Typically, in the
poverty law context, the humble and grateful client acquiesces to the all-
knowing authority of the lawyer, and the latter directs the pace and form
of the representation. However, by assuming unmitigated control over a
client's situation, a poverty lawyer may actually be participating in the
silencing of poor people. In his well-known article entitled "Practicing
Law for Poor People," Stephen Wexler details various ways in which an
individual's socio-economic position will colour the way that they
interact with the law. He writes, "[u]nfortunately, the traditional model
of legal practice for private clients is not what poor people need; in many
ways, it is exactly what they do not need."8 In this article, I will
demonstrate various ways in which the law and lawyers act to perpetuate
the lack of power possessed by poor people. I will look at ways in which
this tendency plays itself out in the casework I have done at Parkdale.
Specifically, I will look at various ways in which the agency of poor
people is inhibited and in some cases even obstructed by the structure of
the profession, of legislation, and of legal practice.
I will examine critically the popular tactic employed by the
poverty lawyer of appealing to the government's collective guilty
conscience when representing a client. Those who have been assessed
social assistance overpayments, those who have been disentitled to
Employment Insurance benefits, those who are about to be evicted or
deported are often presented as helpless, powerless victims in dire
circumstances. While this tactic has proven quite effective in that
individuals cast as victims often win the sympathy of the decisionmaker
and on this basis are granted what it is they are asking for, I will argue
that the portrayal of poor people as victims can be, at best,
counterproductive to the long-term fight against poverty. At worst, this
promotes an image that can influence the client's self-perception in ways
8 S. Wexler, "Practicing Law for Poor People" (1970) 79 Yale L.J. 1049 at 1049.
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that are self-defeating. While the structure and ideology of the legal
profession makes it difficult to facilitate agency on the part of clients in
the poverty law context, I will maintain that there are ways in which we
as lawyers can focus on being resourceful for rather than instructive to
our clients.
II. THE PROBLEM WITH LAWYERS
One of the biggest impediments to facilitating increased
participation of the poor in their own legal situations is the exclusivity
and formalism of legal discourse. The image of law as a highly
specialized body of knowledge, and of lawyers as "experts" in their field,
contributes to feelings of intimidation on the part of the layperson.
Roger Cotterrell describes this phenomenon succinctly:
To many people law seems separate from other aspects of life. It appears as an arcane
world of professionalism centred on a bodyof esoteric knowledge which is intimidating to
the uninitiated in its bulk and obscurity. Laymen usually seek to avoid it. Few actually
want to be involved in litigation. Few people other than lawyers discover the mysteries
contained in the thousands of volumes of law reports and legal treatises. 9
These feelings of exclusion and intimidation felt by the non-legally
trained are often accentuated amongst poor people. Most poor clients
are distinctly different from paying clients of the private bar because
they are generally engaging with the law over basic life necessities-their
entitlements to them, their continued receipt of them, and how much of
them they get. The average poor client is acutely aware of his or her
powerlessness and of the state's power to deny him or -her these survival
basics. In many instances, this self-perception of smallness in relation to
the state results in the client's adopted 9tance of passivity in relation to
authority. Poor clients are often dependent on the state for subsistence,
whereas non-poor clients are not. The resulting psychology of the poor
client is often distinctly more self-effacing and humble than the non-
poor client.
To compound these obstacles, convoluted and sometimes
indecipherable legalese has become the hallmark of the profession's
authenticity, credibility, and prestige; in many ways it is the
inaccessibility of the discourse which commands respect for the law and
instils obedience in those not legally trained. Law presents itself as an
exact science, as a highly specialized and expert discipline. It has a view
of itself as neutral and incontestable. Gerald L6pez writes of lawyers,
9 Cotterrell, supra note 1 at 16.
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We accord them privileged education, status, considerable autonomy, skills, rewards, and
at least some trust in their work. These privileges generate and draw support from the
monopoly of competence that professionals enjoy in their respective fields. We need
lawyers to know law to justify to ourselves both the power we regularly permit them to
exercise and the other privileges we almost naturally afford them.10
As a result of the respectability which society bestows upon the legal
profession, the high earning capacity of lawyers, and the privilege and
social prestige which many in the profession enjoy (and, in most cases
have enjoyed all their lives), many lawyers have an inflated sense of self-
importance-a superiority complex, if you will. This attitude serves to
make the law and lawyers all the more inaccessible to the non-egally
trained generally, and to poor people specifically.
While poverty lawyers are often sensitized to and reflective
about issues such as the inaccessibility of legal practice, and as such tend
usually not to fall into the same type of self-aggrandizement as the
lawyers previously described, it has been noted that poverty lawyers fall
into a different kind of trap. Perhaps in an attempt to prove that he or
she is "not like a typical lawyer," perhaps as a way of giving value to
criminally undervalued work, or perhaps as an expression of basic
human egotism, the poverty lawyer (and others advocating on behalf of
society's "have-nots") slip into what Shelley Gavigan has described as
the state of "heroic white knighthood."11 The problem with this
tendency is that it does a disservice to the poor. Such a mentality is self-
righteous and patronizing, and while the Superhero Poverty Lawyer is
busy rushing in to save the day with the solutions that he or she deems
appropriate for clients, the lawyer is neglecting to listen to what it is their
clients are telling them they need and want.
It is very easy to fall into this trap. In an area of legal practice
that is constantly under attack, undervalued, underfunded, and at times
very frustrating, self-images of martyrdom can seem to be the only
sustenance. It is essential that as poverty lawyers we resist perceiving
ourselves as saviours of the downtrodden: attempts to "rescue" the poor
only serve to entrench further the hierarchical structures of capitalism
and to intensify the unequal power distribution between the poverty
lawyer and the client living in poverty.
10 G.P. L6pez, Rebellious Lawyering: One Chicano's Visidn of Progressive Law Practice
(Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1992) c. 1 at 46.
11 Gavigan, supra note 2 at 178.
1997]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
III. THE TRANSLATION OF POOR PEOPLE'S PROBLEMS
INTO "LEGAL ISSUES"
Due to the exclusivity of legal discourse, due to the law's
dependence on what one author calls "its own internal categories," 12 and
due to the excessive bureaucratization of legal procedures, a major part
of the lawyer's job is translating legalese into lay persons' language, and
conversely, translating the stories of clients into legally recognizable
issues. One author goes so far as to argue that "[t]he lawyers' trade is a
trade built entirely upon words ... . As though it were possible for the
human mind to pull a specific result out of an abstract concept, like a
rabbit out of a hat, without first, knowingly or unknowingly, putting the
result into the concept, so it can later be found there." 13 In this way,
lawyers have much power to define a client's situation. When
representing poor people, the exercise of this power often results in the
client's estrangement from his or her own legal matter. The ultimate
justiciable issue bears little of the client's signature and in effect
becomes a separate entity with a life all its own. Nils Christie argues that
the legal issue-the conflict, if you will-actually becomes commodified,
like a piece of property.1 4 And, it is the lawyer who ultimately exercises
ownership over it and makes a living from negotiating it. The result for
the impoverished client is often a compounded sense of
disempowerment, of disentitlement, and of oppression through silence.
A compelling and poignant example of this silencing in action is
rendered through Lucie White's story of Mrs. G.15 A welfare recipient,
Mrs. G. is assessed with an overpayment and goes to see a poverty
lawyer in her community. White's rendition of Mrs. G.'s interaction with
12 Cotterrell, supra note 1 at 17.
13 F. Rodell as quoted in M. Cain, "The Symbol Traders" in M. Cain & C.B. Harrington, eds.,
Lawyers in a Postmodern World: Translation and Transgression (New York: New York University
Press, 1994) 15 at 15.
14 Nils Christie argues that this dynamic is exacerbated by the image of the lawyer as an
"exliert" For example, the author writes:
[s]pecialization in conflict solution is the major enemy; specialization that in due - or
undue-time leads to professionalisation. That is when the specialists get sufficient
power to claim that they have acquired special gifts, mostly through education, gifts so
powerful that it is obvious that they can only be handled by the certified craftsman.
See N. Christie, "Conflicts as Property" in C.E. Reasons & R.M. Rich, eds., The Sociology of
Law: A Conflict Perspective (Toronto: Butterworths, 1978) 295 at 306-07.
15 See L.E. White, "Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on
the Hearing of Mrs. G." in M.A. Fineman & N. Thomadsen, eds., At the Boundaries of Law:
Feminism and Legal Theory (New York: Routledge, 1991) 40.
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her lawyer exemplifies the inadequacies and artificiality of the law's
insistence on neat, self-contained legal categories: when Mrs. G. meets
with her lawyer, she is told that in order to be successful at a hearing
dealing with a social assistance overpayment, she can tell one of two
possible stories. Mrs. G's reasonable response after hearing the options
was to suggest that they tell both stories. The lawyer arrived at the
conclusion that there were only two viable options by studying the case
law and drawing parallels between the facts of Mrs. G's story and the
existing precedents.
The whole process of taking someone's real-life story and
funnelling it through legal requirements and precedent results in a
product which has been tailor-made to fit into existing legal paradigms.
The nuances and subtleties of an individual's situation become lost as
the facts are sheared into a legally recognizable entity. This process
perpetuates the idea that people's lives can and should be made to fit
into existing legal models, thereby leaving unproblematized the rigidity
and normative bases of those legal categories. As Maureen Cain writes:
A discourse may form the objects of which it speaks, but equally systematically it excludes
the objects of which it cannot speak. Court room ethnographies... have shown how what
is relevant to many plaintiffs and defendants cannot be heard, cannot be made sense of,
cannot be allowed to be spoken in legal discouise... The discourse of law does not
correspond with everyday thought except in those areas of life, such as the stock
exchange, where the legal form has constituted what is everyday.16
Because these legal paradigms are created by and reflect the lives of
those with power, the poor and other marginalized groups are at a
severe disadvantage when evaluated against them. In the process, the
voices of those who are disadvantaged are lost in the cacophony of what
is "legitimate" in legal discourse.
It is imperative for lawyers concerned with poverty and with the
legal system's inaccessibility to poor people to recognize that it is the act
of translating the client's issue into a legal issue which gives that problem
meaning: an individual's situation is "constituted by communication
rather than revealed by it."17 In order for the crafting of the legal issues
of poverty to be authentic, poor people must have license to make their
mark on this translation.
Yet, the lawyer's awareness of the potentially silencing effect of
traditional legal practice on poor clients, and of the dangers involved
16 Cain, supra note 13 at 40-41.
17 Ibid. at 40, citing M. Foucault, The Order of Things (London: Tavistock, 1970).
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when he or she acts as a "traders in legal symbols" 18 is not enough to
discontinue the practice. Until the law itself, and adjudicators as
administrators of the law, become more attuned to and accommodating
of diversity and difference, the lawyer's best efforts to facilitate
participation on the part of her client will be inadequate. As the
situation currently stands, the poverty lawyer concerned with
encouraging the agency of clients is constantly juggling the competing
concerns of (a) ensuring that his or her clients-individuals who have
long been silenced by the system-are afforded the opportunity to
participate in the crafting of their cases (and in the process challenging
the elitist formalism of law); and (b) doing everything possible to speak
in the official and authoritative legal language that he or she knows will
influence adjudicators and will more likely get his or her client what it is
they need and want. Legal "strategy" often overshadows the need to
preserve the authenticity of the client's story. There is a complicated
tension here between the individual and the collective: opting for a
strategy which may get your client what he or she wants, may actually
prove to disadvantage larger groups of marginalized individuals when
the decision becomes a precedent.1 9 Conversely, electing a strategy
which may have the potential to challenge existing laws and legal
processes, may be one which results in your client losing.
Lawyers concerned about the law's insistence on neat,
self-contained categories and about its reliance on normative standards
based on the lives of those with power, must strive to make law's
categories more flexible and dynamic. Only then will those without
18 Cain, supra note 13 at 25-26.
19 1 would argue that an example of an individualized approach which backfired is the feminist
"victory" in R. v. Lavallee, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 852. The appellant was charged with murdering her
abusive common-law spouse. At trial, the defence introduced expert evidence outlining the
components of what it referred to as "Battered Woman's Syndrome" in its attempt to prove that the
appellant reasonably apprehended death or grievous bodily harm from the deceased's violence on
the night of the murder. The defence was successful in legitimating the syndrome and in securing
Lavallee's acquittal on that basis. While Lavallee benefited from the application of the syndrome to
her situation, a very strong argument can be made that the syndrome actually served to perpetuate
the view of women as victims, and moreover, it created a paradigm of "the reasonable battered
woman" against whom the actions of all women in abusive relationships are measured currently.
While Lavallee's defence lawyer was undoubtedly concerned solely with successfully defending his
client, the case illustrates the degree to which legal strategies aimed at addressing social problems
deemed to be "individual" can set complicated and unpredictable precedents for larger collectives
of people similarly situated. A major challenge for lawyers committed to using the courts to
address social inequities continues to be how to facilitate the decisionmaker's recognition of
victimization and human hardship caused by social disadvantage without reducing one's client to a
stereotype.
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power, without capital, feel comfortable engaging with law actively; only
then will the formulation of legal issues bear the client's signature.
When lawyers engage in the act of administering the law for poor
people uncritically, we facilitate and fortify the silencing effect that law
has on the marginalized. In this way, lawyers become dupes of the
state's pro-capital, status quo agenda. Many have observed and
documented the seemingly inherent role that law plays in oppressing the
powerless and in acting as a mechanism of social control. For example,
Cotterrell writes:
Law has now come to be recognised as an agency of power; an instrument of government.
Insofar as government is centralised in the state, law appears exclusively as the law of the
state. In the lawyer's view and in the wider public view it has come to be seen as separate
from the society it regulates. It has become possible to talk about law acting upon society,
rather than law as an aspect of society. Thus law has come to be seen as an independent
agency of social control and social direction. It appears autonomous within society. A
modern legal system is understood as a distinct set of mechanisms of government
employing rationally developed doctrine created, interpreted and applied by specialised
state agencies.2 0
The observation has been made that lawyers, as espousers of and
adherents to law, are participants in its oppressive nature, in its
discriminatory regulation, and in its inequities; lawyers in effect are
"greasing the wheels" for the law as a tool of social oppression, and are
perpetuating the legitimacy and facilitating the operation of an unjust
system. Marxist analyses have attempted to explain
how law operates as an instrument of repression promoting the interests of certain classes
at the expense of those of others in contemporary Western societies while, at the same
time, contributing to shape a climate of thought in these societies that makes possible a
reduction of direct repression through law to a minimum.21
Yet, if all poverty lawyers in Toronto simultaneously withdrew their
services, the result would most certainly be increased suffering for the
poor. While a reconceptualization of the work that poverty lawyers do is
essential, I would argue that it must take place while we continue to
represent the poor. We cannot put our work on hold until we devise the
perfect way to help poor people. Besides, there will never be unanimous
agreement amongst leftist activist lawyers on what the best strategies for
self-reform are. Furthermore, I am not of the mind that there is nothing
redemptive about law as a mechanism for bringing about positive social
change. Of dominant ideologies in society, law is a discourse which at
least pays lip-service to the ideals of justice. As such, it continues to be a
20 Cotterrell, supra note 1 at 44-45.
21 ibid. at 106-07.
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site where power relations can be debated, challenged and reconstituted.
E.P. Thompson's words are inspiring in this regard:
It is true that in history the law can be seen to mediate and to legitimize existent class
relations. Its forms and procedures may crystallize those relations and mask ulterior
injustice. But this mediation, through the forms of law, is something quite distinct from
the exercise of unmediated force. The forms and rhetoric of law acquire a distinct
identity which may, on occasion, inhibit power and afford some protection to the
powerless.22
Besides, poor people do not have the luxury of choosing whether or not
they will engage with law. As Wexler writes, "poor people must go to
government officials for many of the things which not-poor people get
privately ... . Poverty creates an abrasive interface with society; poor
people are always bumping into sharp legal things."23 Consequently, as
lawyers, we have to continue to try to renegotiate with legal discourse
while simultaneously challenging its inadequacies.
IV. THE DANGER AND INACCURACY OF CASTING THE
POOR UNEQUIVOCALLY AS VICTIMS
When the poor come before decisionmakers in courts or
administrative bodies, they often do so as individuals who are weak,
down on their luck, even helpless and vulnerable. This posture is
adopted by the poor for several reasons. By enlisting the services of a
lawyer, by relinquishing control to a lawyer-someone reputed to be
smart, familiar with the system, and combative-the client is able to
withdraw and become a passive player in the outcome of his or her
situation. Playing the role of victim often allows the client to "relieve a
burdensome sense of responsibility or self-blame. Victim status can
support a sense of solidarity with others who have suffered in similar
ways."2 4 Furthermore, decisionmakers have shown themselves to be
22 Quoted in Gavigan, supra note 2 at 177.
23 Wexler, supra note 8 at 1050.
24 M. Minow, "Surviving Victim Talk" (1993) 40 UCLA L. Rev. 1411 at 1413-14, citing S.
Wendell, "Oppression & Victimization: Choice and Responsibility" in D. Shogan, ed., A Reader in
Feminist Ethics (Toronto: Canadian Scholars Press, 1993) 277 at 287. This is not to say, however,
that poor people always seek to relinquish responsibility for their situations. It is acknowledged that
in many instances, those living in poverty blame themselves for their circumstances and are entirely
encouraged to do so by the dominant ideology of the liberal democratic capitalist state which
overemphasizes the agency that individuals have to affect the outcome of their lives. It is my
assertion, however, that the poor are neither entirely responsible nor completely blameless for their
situations. While recognizing the magnitude of systemic inequities, I would still maintain that
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quite receptive to the helpless, the enfeebled, the victimized. The
paternalist and protectionist premise upon which law functions gives
victimhood its power. It fulfils a cathartic outlet for society's collective
sense of guilt when adjudicators are provided with the opportunity to
make magnanimous gestures of charity which cost them very little and
require no long-term commitment.
The lawyer in the story of Mrs. G. finds herself having to contend
with the temptation to portray her clients as victims quite frequently.
She reflects:
As I thought about the choices, I felt myself in a bind. The estoppel story would feel
good in the telling, but at the likely cost of losing the hearing, and provoking the country's
ire. The hearing officer-though charged to be neutral-would surely identify with the
county in this challenge to the government's power to evade the costs of its own mistakes.
The necessities story would force Mrs. G. to grovel, but it would give both county and
state what they wanted to hear-another "yes sir" welfare recipient ... . This bind was
familiar to me as a poverty lawyer. I felt it most strongly in disability hearings, when I
would counsel clients to describe themselves as totally helpless in order to convince the
court that they met the statutory definition of disability. But I had faced it in AFDC work
as well, when I taught women to present themselves as abandoned, depleted of resources,
and encumbered by children, to qualify for relief. I taught them to say yes to the
degrading terms of "income security", as it was called-invasions of sexual privacy,
disruption of kin-ties, the forced choice of one sibling's welfare over another's.25
The temptation to present clients as victims occurs often in the workers'
rights division at PcLs. A client assessed with an Employment Insurance
overpayment and/or penalty will often be more successful in convincing
the Commission to reconsider the decision if they present themselves as
destitute, weak, and pathetic. Similarly, employees who file human
rights complaints on the basis of discrimination will generate more
sympathy and get better results if they adopt the posture of victims.
Joseph Amato cites Gandhi as one of the main historical figures
who recognized the power in victimhood:
relationships between individuals and the state are negotiable and interactive, albeit to varying
degrees. It is imperative to be critical of the discourses which shape the poor as either completely
blameless or entirely responsible for their situations. The view which one has of the power of
individuals directly correlates to the power one attributes to the state. For example, from an
orthodox Marxist, or instrumentalist perspective, individuals are acted upon by economic
relationships mediated through the State. From a liberal point of view, individuals have nearly
unlimited power to determine their situations. I am of the view that both of these perspectives are
reductive and fail to describe adequately the complexity and inconstancy of power, and the
negotiations which take place daily between individuals and those institutions commonly identified
as "The State."
My point in this part is twofold: first, images of victimhood in the courtroom and other legal
fora are powerful and as a result alluring; second, the power and allure of victimhood need to be
problematized because what may be a "successful" litigation strategy for an individual in the short-
term may have undesirable consequences for the larger collective in the long-term.
25 White, supra note 15 at 43.
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[Gandhi] made willingness to suffer and be a victim a means to power, which became in
the course of the century an increasingly common means for the weak to deny moral
legitimacy to the established order.... [V]ictim status gives powerful moral leverage. It is
a means of controlling much of society's diffuse guilt.26
However, in many important ways it is counterproductive to the
empowerment of the poor to encourage the presentation of oneself as a
victim. To begin with, some people will refrain from invoking their
rights when they realize that in order to be successful in a legal forum,
they will have to assume the posture of one who is helpless and
victimized. Many feel that this image is humiliating, reductive, and fails
to convey an image of themselves that they can recognize. As Kristin
Bumiller writes, "[t]his transforms a social conflict into a psychological
contest to reconcile a positive self-image with the image of the victim as
powerless and defeated. Deciding whether or not to make a public claim
of discrimination thus becomes intertwined with the process of
reconciling these self-images." 27 The individual in question is reduced to
a stereotype and all that is unique about that person is obscured.
Moreover, once one accepts the label of victim, any act of agency or
empowerment is regarded as inconsistent and therefore contradictory
behaviour, as an indication that the person in question is disingenuous,
untrustworthy and incredible. If one is going to present oneself as a
victim, then one has to adopt the role completely. In the case of
battered women, for instance, if a woman's decision not to leave her
abusive partner is explained by the fact that she was a victim, then it may
be difficult for her to prove that her helplessness does not prevent her
from being able to care for her children when it comes time for the
courts to make a decision as to her fitness as a mother.
The overemphasis on victimhood can also lead to self-fulfilling
prophecies amongst those adopting that role. Those individuals
assuming the role of the disempowered may actually come to see
themselves as such. Wendy Kaminer writes, "[t]he cult of victimhood
reflects a collective sense of resignation. It responds to widespread
feelings of helplessness in the face of poverty, crime, disease, pollution,
bureaucracy, taxes, deficit spending, technology, terrorism, and whatever
else composes the crises of post-modernity."28 In effect, victimhood
impedes the potential of the poor to organize, to galvanize the strength
that they do possess and to use it collectively.
26 Minow, supra note 24 at 1413, n. 5, n. 6.
2 7 IC Bumiller, "Victims in the Shadow of the Law" (1987) 12 Signs 421 at 433.
28 Minow, supra note 24 at 1430, n. 85.
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Besides, the portrayal of our clients as a group of individuals
encumbered by unmitigated victimization is inauthentic. We know that
our clients as a group engage in acts of agency every day. For example,
many of our clients have lived on the streets, without the security of food
or shelter; they have worked in low-paying sweatshop jobs putting in
more hours in a week than most people work in two weeks; they have
survived the psychiatric system; they have emerged from abusive
relationships; they have mustered the ingenuity and creativity necessary
to support themselves and their children on seemingly unliveable
amounts of money; they have come to a new country, they have
mastered living in an urban city-centre, taught themselves a new
language, sponsored their loved ones, and much more. To paint these
people unreservedly as helpless victims is at the very least inaccurate and
at worst actually serves to perpetuate stereotypes which can potentially
be counterproductive and harmful.
While capitalism and the ideology of liberal democracy can be
blamed for many of the obstacles in the way of those living in poverty, I
think it is also important to recognize that in some situations, some
individuals who live in poverty do contribute negatively, by the decisions
that they make, to their circumstances and their situations. To deny this
is to romanticize the poor, to treat them as morally superior simply
because they live in poverty and experience its accompanying hardships.
Also, to deny the power that the poor have to make their situations
worse is to also deny that they have any power to make their situations
better. Even within capitalism, individuals can be said to have a sphere
of agentic power. It is helpful to imagine that sphere as a small circle
within the larger confines of state constriction. While our choices within
that circle will clearly be influenced by the traits of and goings on within
the larger circumference, the image is illustrative and effective because it
helps to demonstrate the power and mobility which we all possess, albeit
to varying degrees. Otherwise, how would we explain the fact-as
evidenced in our casework at the clinic-that individuals similarly
situated often make choices and decisions which vary widely. As Sarah
Lucia Hoagland writes, "[t]he oppressed still go on under oppression
and make choices even when coerced and exploited."29 How also could
we explain the behaviour of those who resisted the agenda of the Third
Reich, or other political dictatorships? History has shown time and
again that an individual-departing from the accepted social mores of
his or her day-can make an enormous impact on the outcome of a
29 S.L. Hoagland, Lesbian Ethics, Toward New Value (Palo Alto: Institute of Lesbian Studies,
1992) c. 5 at 212.
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particular set of circumstances. While descriptions of systemic
discrimination and trends of marginalization are useful and necessary for
public education and for strategies of community activism, we must
always emphasize that the law and the state can be sites of struggle and
resistance.
By portraying poor people as unqualified victims of racism,
sexism, capitalism, and other forms of systemic oppression, we negate
the idea that individuals living in poverty possess the potential to actively
work toward ending their societal disadvantage-through organizing,
subversion, and resistance. To deny that individuals living in
disadvantaged situations have this agency is to ignore historical examples
of insurgency. What is needed is a refusal to pigeonhole the poor as
either victims or agents. At some points in their lives, our clients have
been victimized. At others they have exercised the powers of self-
determination and resistance. An individual's relationship with the state
and social structures is not static; it is fluid and ever-changing. What is
needed is an exploration of "the interrelationship between, and
simultaneity of, oppression and resistance." 30
So, while it is essential to work from a starting point which
acknowledges the systemic nature of oppression and the fact that those
without money are among its prime targets, we need to explore the ways
in which the poor do possess power and agency. This is crucial because
as Wexler writes,
Poverty will not be stopped by people who are not poor. If poverty is stopped, it will be
stopped by poor people. And poor people can stop poverty only if they work at it
together. The lawyer who wants to serve poor people must put his skills to the task of
helping poor people organize themselves ... . Specifically, the lawyer must seek to
strengthen existing organizations of poor people, and to help poor people start
organizations where none exist.31
Once the movement against poverty is engineered by those living in
indigence, the non-poor will be better able to play a resourceful and
supportive role rather than a controlling and instructive one.
30 E. Schneider, "Feminism and the False Dichotomy of Victimization and Agency" (1993) 38
N.Y.L Sch. L. Rev. 387 at 397.
31 Wexler, supra note 8 at 1053-54.
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V. WHAT CAN WE DO AT THE CLINIC?
PRACTICAL APPLICATION
The changes implemented to employment legislation under the
provincial and federal governments have made it much more difficult for
lawyers to handle the employment problems of the poor. In Ontario, the
Harris government made large-scale changes to the Employment
Standards Act. The limitation period to file a claim with the Ministry of
Labour has been reduced to six months from two years. The maximum
amount of money to which an employee can be entitled under the
Employee Wage Protection Fund has been capped at $2,000. The
extensive staff cuts at the Ministry of Labour have dramatically slowed
down the processing of claims. From the time a claim is made, it has
been taking between six to eight months for a fact-finding meeting to be
scheduled. If the claimant wins the fact-finding, it can take over a year
for the employment standards officer to issue an order to pay. And
then, if the employer chooses not to abide by the order to pay, there
have been no consequences because orders are not being enforced. And
those are only the procedural changes-the substantive changes are yet
to come. The Workers' Compensation Act is next in line for "reform." At
the federal level, the Liberal government effectively rewrote the
Unemployment Insurance Act. The Employment Insurance Act32 makes it
more difficult for unemployed workers to get benefits and it decreases
the time that individuals are entitled to benefits.
All of these changes make it much more difficult to invoke the
employment rights of the poor. There is less that we can actually do
materially for our clients in the way of engagement with the law, and due
to the high rate of unemployment greater numbers of people require
government assistance. So, what can we do? More importantly, what
can poor people do? In this part, I will set out some practical strategies
which I believe have the potential to facilitate the increased cooperation
of individuals living in poverty.
While those without money must be at the centre of any
movement to eradicate (or at least lessen the effects of) poverty, there is
a role to play for poverty lawyers, community organizers and others not
necessarily living in poverty, but concerned with its effects. Most
importantly, I think that non-poor poverty activists must reconceptualize
their positions. Instead of acting as the spokespeople of the poor, we
must maximize our abilities as resource people. In this regard, Wexler's
3 2 Supra note 3.
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words are instructive: "[t]he lawyer must offer information so that
people can structure their own alternatives and make their own choices
among them. The lawyer may know what the law can do; the people
know what needs to be done, and what can be done."33 As poverty
lawyers, we need to focus on what it is we can do to better connect those
living in poverty. Underlying these efforts should still be the goal of
bringing to the public's attention the themes and trends of poverty, its
systemic nature, and its social effects.
Assuming the role of information-giver rather than agent will be
difficult for lawyers because of the structure of the profession. In some
ways, the structure and protocol of the profession will prevent lawyers
from relinquishing their role as agent completely. All lawyers practising
law in Ontario must adhere to the principles set out in The Rules of
Professional Conduct. These Rules are a code of ethics designed to
govern a lawyer's conduct in such a manner so as to maintain "public
confidence in the administration of justice and in the legal profession."3 4
For all intents and purposes, the Rules are binding in that the Law
Society of Upper Canada has the power to terminate the professional
livelihood of bar members through disbarment. It is seemingly
inevitable, however, that a progressive lawyer will find it difficult to
reconcile and negotiate his or her commitment to challenging the legal
system, specific laws in particular, and capitalism more generally with his
or her obligations to the Law Society.
Implicit in the Rules is an unquestioning respect, at times almost
a reverence, for the sanctity and wisdom of the values contained therein.
The Rules are fashioned to address potential problems and conflicts
occurring within the private bar, although they apply equally to lawyers
doing clinic and legal aid work. They facilitate the smooth operation of
existing laws and legal practices in the civil, criminal, and administrative
contexts, and as a result, fail to provide an adequate internal mechanism
whereby lawyers committed to legal reform can safely challenge
normative legal values and legislation in their casework.35 Michelle
33 Supra note 8 at 1064.
34 See Law Society of Upper Canada, Professional Conduct Handbook (Toronto: LSUC, 1997)
[hereinafter Rules].
35 A possible exception to this observation is found in the Commentary to Rule 21 which deals
with "Lawyers in their Public Appearances and Public Statements." After itemizing extensively the
parameters within which a lawyer can engage with media, public educational bodies, and public
communication systems more generally, Note 4 of the Commentary states, at 66, "The lawyer is
often involved as advocate for special interest groups whose objective it is to bring about changes in
legislation, governmental policy, or even a heightened public awareness about certain issues. This is
also an important role that a lawyer can be called upon to play." This commentary, however, raises
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Jacobs, writing in the American context, discusses the obligation of a
lawyer to represent clients "zealously" while still adhering to the rules of
professional ethics. She speaks of the "edge" of one's ethical obligations
and states that subversive lawyering may require one to go to that edge,
it may even necessitate that one step on that edge, but it should never
require one to cross over it.36 However, the number of inquiring calls to
the Law Society on a daily basis indicate that to many lawyers, both
experienced and inexperienced, the contours of that "edge" are not
immediately recognizable. This uncertainty becomes especially
problematic in the poverty law context where an overload of cases, a dire
shortage of time, energy, resources, and bodies necessitate increased
creativity in dealing with clients.
Rule 2, which aims to cover "Competence and Quality of
Service" exemplifies the Rules' reliance on unproblematized conceptions
of what it means to be a good lawyer. For example, Rule 2(b) states:
"[t]he lawyer should serve the client in a conscientious, diligent and
efficient manner, and should provide a quality of service at least equal to
that which lawyers generally would expect of a competent lawyer in a like
situation and should avoid unsatisfactory professional practice."3 7 The
concept of professional "competence" within the legal profession is not a
stable signifier. In other words, while there are certainly behaviours
within the profession which most lawyers would unanimously describe as
competent or incompetent-for example, most would agree that regular
communication, punctuality, and attentiveness are traits which mark the
competent lawyer-there is a variance of opinion amongst members of
the legal community on the subject of what is best for the client.
A lawyer is supposed to take instructions from his or her client,
but very often we know that the client feels instructed, even bullied, by
the lawyer. Notions of competence on Bay Street, or Wall Street, may
be less contentious than notions of competence amongst non-traditional
lawyers. Within the realm of progressive lawyering, there is great
divergence on the subject of what constitutes good lawyering, or
"competence" if you will. In a chapter entitled "The Rebellious Idea of
Lawyering Against Subordination," L6pez elucidates quite poignantly
the breadth of practice in which individuals committed to social reform
more questions than it answers in that the competing obligations of "special interest" lawyers are
acknowledged, but no practical suggestions are made as to solutions.
36 M.S. Jacobs, "Legal Professionalism: Do Ethical Rules Require Zealous Representation for
Poor People?" (1995) 8 St. Thomas L. Rev. 97 at 97.
3 7 Rules, supra note 34 at 3 [emphasis added].
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participate3 8 He describes the habits and professional styles of five
different lawyers committed to left activist lawyering. Among this small
sample alone, what constitutes competence is heavily contested. Is it
competence to act on behalf of your client if by doing so you are actually
depriving that individual of the agency to act for themselves? On the
other hand, is it incompetence to facilitate the client's involvement in
community activism and organizing if the result is that the lawyer
appears to be shuffling off onto the client things that a "lawyer in a like
situation" would undertake themselves? Does a victory for your
individual client outweigh the lawyer's responsibility to the collective,
whether that collective be poor people, women, people of colour, gays
and lesbians, the elderly, the disabled? Does the fact that the Rules
focus exclusively on the individual client justify acting in ways which
would damage the social position of the larger collective?
By encouraging self-help strategies for clients living in poverty,
lawyers run the risk of violating both Rules 11 and 16. Rule 11 states
that "[t]he lawyer should encourage public respect for and try to improve
the administration of justice."39 It is foreseeable that a lawyer who
attempts to challenge accepted legal practices could be deemed by the
Law Society to be in contravention of this Rule. Note 1 of the
Commentary for Rule 11 states, "[tihe lawyer must not subvert the law
by counselling or assisting in activities which are in defiance of it."40
What constitutes "defiance" is open to debate, particularly when the
approach taken by the client on the lawyer's advice results in claims
taking a longer time to be processed, or when the volume of claims
increases so dramatically that administrative bodies are overwhelmed.
Peter Gabel and Paul Harris cite specific examples of solicitor
behaviour in the American context geared toward challenging the
authority and sanctity of accepted legal forms.41 In particulir, they refer
to attempts made by lawyers to alter the symbolic authority of the
courtroom set-up so as to make clients and juries feel less alienated and
daunted. As such behaviour could substantially alter the flow of
courtroom proceedings, protract the time spent in court, and unfairly
disadvantage the other side, it could conceivably be deemed "defiant"
and as such could potentially come into conflict with Rule 11. In some
38 Supra note 10, c. 2.
39 Ibid. at 39.
4 0 Ibid.
41 p. Gabel & P. Harris, "Building Power and Breaking Images: Critical Legal Theory and the
Practice of Law" (1982-83) 11 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 369 at 399-403.
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instances, the difference between creative challenges to unjust and/or
stagnant legal forms on the one hand, and defiance of the administration
of justice on the other, is all in the interpretation of the decisionmaker
or the Law Society.
Similarly, some self-help strategies involve the delegation of
tasks normally considered the responsibility of lawyers to non-legal
persons or to the clients themselves. Delegation in the legal profession
in Ontario is regulated by Rule 16. While the Rule seems to
contemplate the use of law clerks, and other such non-legal persons, it is
conceivable that in attempting to establish self-help clinics, and other
community-directed strategies of alternative legal practice, a lawyer
could run the risk of overstepping the boundaries of what is permissible
under this Rule. Furthermore, the Rule makes it abundantly clear that
the Law Society perceives the lawyer to have a high degree of
specialization and expertise, qualifications which the average non-
lawyer, let alone the poor non-lawyer is deemed not to possess. Rule
16(2) states: "the question of what the lawyer may delegate to a non-
lawyer turns upon the distinction between any special knowledge of the
non-lawyer and the professional and legal judgment of the lawyer which
in the public interest must be exercised by the lawyer whenever it is
required."42 The image of the highly specialized licensed professional is
at the heart of the legal profession's exclusivity and elitism-only a
relatively few specially trained individuals in society are "qualified" to
administer justice.43
Conceivably, Rule 17, which regulates "Outside Interests and the
Practice of Law" also poses an obstacle for activist lawyers in the poverty
law context. Rule 17 states: "The lawyer who engages in another
profession, business or occupation concurrently with the practice of law
must not allow such outside interest to jeopardize the lawyer's
4 2 Rules, supra note 34 at 53.
43 Rule 16(3) states:
The burden rests upon the lawyer who uses a non-lawyer to educate the latter with
respect to the duties that may be assigned to the non-lawyer, and then to supervise the
manner in which such duties are carried out. The lawyer should review the non-lawyer's
work at sufficiently frequent intervals to enable the lawyer to ensure its proper and timely
completion.
While this guideline does seem to allow-at least on a theoretical level-for the cooperation of
lawyers and non-lawyers in the poverty law setting, its practical application is more problematic. To
begin with, it relies on and perpetuates the image of the lawyer as the one with true wisdom and
ability, and it gives further credence to the authority and omniscience accorded to legal discourse.
It indicates a lack of confidence in the non-legally trained, and it obstructs the lawyer's efforts to
encourage greater independence on the part of clients, and to demystify what it is lawyers do.
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professional integrity, independence or competence." 44 The term
"outside interest" is meant in the broadest possible sense and would
seem to include such things as community organizing and social activism.
The lawyer who attempts to participate in both lawyering (as defined by
the Law Society) and community work simultaneously, and who attempts
to integrate the two, runs the risk of jeopardizing what the Law Society
calls "the lawyer's independent judgment on behalf of clients."45 Again,
what is best for the client is open to debate when the interests of the
individual client are at odds with the interests of the collective of which
the client may be a part. In addition, it is unclear in certain instances
what type of conduct the Law Society refers to when it advises against
lawyers engaging in behaviour which "might bring the lawyer or the
profession into disrepute, or impair the lawyer's competence." 46 Some
forms of legal practice which have law reform as their objectives could
be said to "bring the profession into disrepute" if one considers that
what many would consider harmful to the reputation of the profession
would derive from dominant ideas about what lawyers do and should do,
and about what roles the client should or should not play in legal
proceedings.
The question for poverty lawyers then, is how can we recognize
agency on the part of the poor while still abiding by The Rules of
Professional Conduct? In order to practise law in Ontario, one must
abide by the Rules; however, the Rules should never be accepted as
neutral or universally recognizable guidelines. As Steven Bachmann has
argued, "[t]he progressive lawyer must be familiar with professional
rules of ethics as they have conscientiously been used by elite groups to
crush progressive movements." 47 As progressive lawyers, we will likely
spend our entire careers balancing these competing interests.
In addition, as we attempt to move within the confines of the
Rules, we must also ask ourselves if gambling on the uncertain outcome
of our anti-poverty initiatives justifies putting clients in possible jeopardy
in the short term. We must consider whether it is appropriate to be
minimizing our services in the poverty law context at a time when it
would seem that issues of poverty require all the representation and
attention they can get. Poor people, so long deprived of access to legal
44 Rules, supra note 34 at 57.
45 Ib at 57.
46 Ibld.
47 S. Bachmann, "Lawyers, Law and Social Change" (1984-85) 13 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc.
Change 1 at 26.
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representation, deserve the same service and counsel as those hiring
lawyers from the private bar. It seems especially risky and unwise to
withdraw these services when we know that, in the legal context, poor
people will continue to be opposed by individuals who can afford to hire
adversarial members of the private bar.48
Empowerment of the poor will not come from a withdrawal of
legal services. If we, as advocates of the poor, simultaneously withdrew
the provision of our services, the current system would not bow down in
penitent acquiescence under the weight of our moral uprightness, but
rather, the system would greedily digest its unprotected prey and the fit
that continued to survive would simply become relatively more fit. In
the meantime, we need to work in collaboration with not for the poor.
Poverty will only be eradicated through the coordinated efforts and
actions of various different sectors of society committed to ending the
oppression of the poor. We must work to create alliances aimed at
taking the poor out of isolation. As L6pez writes:
Lawyers must know how to work with (not just on behalf of) women, low-income people,
people of color, gays and lesbians, the disabled, and the elderly. They must know how to
collaborate with other professional and lay allies rather than ignoring the help that these
other problem-solvers may provide in a given situation. They must understand how to
educate those with whom they work, particularly about law and professional lawyering,
and, at the same time, they must open themselves up to being educated by all those with
whom they come in contact, particularly about the traditions and experiences of life on
the bottom and at the margins.49
One viable self-help strategy in the workers' rights division at
PCs would be to organize clinics that specifically dealt with employment
standards claims. The clinic could train community members to be
familiar with the claim forms, and they, in turn, could assist and teach
members of the community how to file a claim against employers for
unpaid wages, vacation, holiday, overtime, and termination pay. The
clinic could employ what L6pez calls "imaginative case processing"50 to
avoid the duplication and repetition of work, to equip clients with the
know-how to solve employment problems on their own, and ultimately,
to facilitate the service and submission of a higher volume of claims.
In addition, the clinic could help to break down statutory jargon
by producing self-help kits and manuals, whereby workers could access
legal remedies on their own without the aid of lawyers. rcLs already has
48 Gavigan, supra note 2 at 176.
4 9 L6pez, supra note 10 at 37.
50 lbid at 32.
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"The Workers' Real Self-Help Kit"51 to deal with employment standards
claims. In addition to ensuring that this kit is more widely circulated, we
could create a similar kit for human rights complaints, Employment
Insurance benefits, and workers' compensation entitlement. Self-help
kits and manuals written in simple language help to demystify the law for
the non-legally trained. The clinic could train members of the
community to be especially familiar with one area of employment
legislation and they in turn could help others to be familiar with and to
invoke their rights in that area. By breaking down legalese and by
facilitating the access of the poor to rights, lawyers concerned with
fighting poverty are challenging, on a practical level, what L6pez has
described as the "regnant" idea of lawyering,52 while simultaneously
adapting the traditional dynamics of the solicitor-client relationship to
meet the distinct needs of those living in poverty.
In addition, the ESWG 53 has devised what it calls "The Bad Boss
Hotline." The hotline is a number that anyone can call to relay stories of
bad bosses. The ESWG has used these stories to identify which employers
are violating the employment standards protected in this province. The
ESWG has used the information relayed by workers to conduct
"community audits" of bad bosses. At the clinic, we could take the
creative lead of the ESWG and recruit members of the community to
initiate community audits. As individuals familiar with laws surrounding
civil disobedience, we could train community members to engage in
peaceful and legal acts of resistance to the violations of employment
laws by employers. This could mean sit-ins at restaurants and cafes
known to treat their workers unfairly. This could mean publicized
boycotts of clothing manufacturers and retail outlets that pay their
workers less than minimum wage. Along the same lines, members of the
community could picket the establishments of bad bosses, thereby letting
the community know which employers are committing violations and
sending out a message to other employers that there are consequences
to be paid for not obeying employment laws.
51 This kit is a package put together by PCs, the Workers' Information and Action Centre of
Toronto (WIAcr), and the Employment Standards Work Group (aswo). The kit provides step-by-
step instructions on how to redress employment standards violations, from the stage of writing
demand letters to employers, to filing employment-standards claims with the Ontario Ministry of
Labour.
52 Lopez, supra note 10 at 23, n. 10.
53 The Employment Standards Work Group is a network of approximately thirty-five
community organizations, legal clinics, and unions who work with, represent, and advocate for low-
income, unorganized workers in Toronto. Its primary objective is to improve the Employment
Standards Act, supra note 3.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The main objective of non-poor poverty activists should be to
facilitate the involvement-not through instruction, but through
resourcefulness-of the poor in fighting against the shackles of poverty.
While poverty affects the poor in ways different than it does the non-
poor-and as such, the poor will often have experiences and
perspectives which the non-poor will not-those not living directly in
poverty experience its repercussions as well. A movement in the realm
of progressive lawyering to recognize the agency of the poor should be
premised on the understanding that to not recognize this agency is to
perpetuate and sustain unequal power relations in society in the long
term. Poverty lawyers and community legal workers in the clinic system
are in strategic positions to facilitate the agency of those who require
legal representation. A successful movement to eradicate poverty will
feature the efforts of these individuals as a supplement to the efforts of
those living in poverty. While the harshest and most direct
consequences of poverty are unquestionably felt only by those without
money, its more subtle effects are borne by society at large. Our
capacity for growth and development as a nation will be maximized only




Jameson Avenue street scene, 1996
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